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A PLAINLY OBVIOUS NEED FOR NEW-FASHIONED
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY: THE DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE STANDARD AND BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BRYAN
COUNTY v. BROWN
INTRODUCTION
Abner Louima, a Haitian immigrant, alleges that on August 9, 1997,
New York police officers from the seventieth precinct sodomized him
with the wooden handle of a toilet plunger and then forced the handle
down his throat.1 Officers arrested Louima outside of a dance club
after a fight broke out.2 They charged him with disorderly conduct,
obstructing governmental administration, and resisting arrest.
3
Louima suffered numerous injuries, resulting in his hospitalization. 4
1. David Kocieniewski, Injured Man Says Brooklyn Officers Tortured Him in Custody, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at Bi; Mike McAlary, The Last Cop Story, ESQUIRE, Dec. 1997, at 118,
153. On the way to the station, officers beat Louima twice in the car. Only a Minority: Police
Brutality, ECONOMIST, Aug. 23, 1997, at 19, 19.
2. Kocieniewski, supra note 1, at B1. Louima claims the officers arrested him after a fight
between two women broke out outside of the club and someone else punched Officer Justin
Volpe in the face. McAlary, supra note 1, at 124, 153. He also stated that the officers made
racial comments to him. Id. at 153.
3. Kocieniewski, supra note 1, at B1.
4. Id. Officers who brought Louima to Coney Island Hospital in Brooklyn stated that homo-
sexual activity outside of a gay bar caused his injuries. John Kifner, Nurse Tells of Retaliation for
Efforts in Louima Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1997, at B4. Owners of Club Rendez-Vous, the
bar outside of which the officers arrested Louima, stated that they played Creole music the night
of the arrest and catered to all audiences. Latest Developments, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Aug.
21, 1997, at A14. Louima left the hospital on October 10, 1997 with a damaged colon and a loss
of forty pounds since the attack. Garry Pierre-Pierre, After 2 Months, Beating Victim Is Out of
Hospital, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1997, at B1. His doctor stated that Louima's condition did not
clearly demonstrate whether he will ever fully recover. Id. at B3. As of the date of publication,
the officers involved received indictments on federal charges, and Louima filed a $155 million
lawsuit against the city. Garry Pierre-Pierre, Louima Voices a Measure of Defiance, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 1998, at B5; see Joseph P. Fried, In Louima Case, Dream Team and Perhaps Overkill,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1997, § 1, at 37, 41 (discussing "overkill" of famed attorneys Johnnie
Cochran, Jr., Barry Scheck, and Peter Neufeld agreeing to handle Louima's civil case). In addi-
tion, federal prosecutors charged a sergeant with attempting to cover-up the incident by falsify-
ing an arrest report. Joseph P. Fried, U.S. Takes Over the Louima Case: 5th Suspect, a Sergeant,
Is Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1998, at Al.
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Louima's case represents a highly publicized and extreme example
of how many officers abuse their authority.5 The incident sparked nu-
5. Louima's case clearly involves abuses based on racial hatred and possibly other prejudices.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY IN THE UNITED STATES 275 (1998) (finding a frequent "racial or ethnic component" to New
York City police abuse cases); Jungwon Kim, Protesters Target Police Brutality: Aim at Brooklyn
70th Precinct, NEWSDAY, Aug. 24,1997, at A28 (quoting protesters at a demonstration on August
23, 1997 as asserting that New York police officers' racial discrimination remains a systemic
problem). This Comment will not examine the issue of racial motivation in police abuse cases or
the complex factors behind officers' misconduct. For some recent articles on the interplay of
police misconduct and race relations, see Robin D. Barnes, Blue by Day and White by [K]night:
Regulating the Political Affiliations of Law Enforcement and Military Personnel, 81 IOWA L. REV.
1079, 1091 (1996) ("Klan-cops have operated solo and in groups while conspiring to harass, in-
timidate, and even kill members of minority communities .... A few of today's self-identified
white supremacists admit that they actively pursue employment in law enforcement agencies.");
Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal Role in Control-
ling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1455-61 (1993) (arguing that the
Reagan and Bush administrations failed to combat police abuse and that the Rodney King beat-
ing demonstrates the need for a more active federal government in this area); Sheri Lynn John-
son, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 237-50 (1983) (criticizing
judicial acceptance of the use of race as a factor justifying reasonable suspicion for an arrest);
Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters"-Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth
Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 262-78 (1991) (contending
that the Court should consider race in dealing with the constitutionality of a police confronta-
tion); Adina Schwartz, "Just Take Away Their Guns": The Hidden Racism of Terry v. Ohio, 23
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 317, 360-75 (1996) (arguing that the disparity between races in stop and
frisks should be a factor in formulating racially neutral standards for police action); Robert V.
Ward, Consenting to a Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority Neighborhoods: No Place for a
"Reasonable Person," 36 How. L.J. 239, 253-58 (1993) (finding that the Supreme Court's "rea-
sonable person" test for consenting to searches and seizures promotes police abuse against mi-
norities and that a more subjective standard should be applied).
The motivations behind officers' backlash against certain members of society may result from
more than racial tensions, however. See, e.g., FRANK DONNER, PROTCrORS OF PRIVILEGE: RED
SQUADS AND POLICE REPRESSION IN URBAN AMERICA (1990) (tracing various forms of police
abuse aimed at persons speaking out against the government, the poor, and minorities); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra, at 34-35 (finding weak civilian review boards, leadership failure, ineffec-
tual civil remedies, and a lack of criminal prosecutions as all factors contributing to police mis-
conduct); Irving Joyner, Litigating Police Misconduct Claims, 19 N.C. CENT. L.J. 113, 113 (1991)
("Some victims of police misconduct, however, are persons with outstanding backgrounds and
credentials who simply have had the misfortune of having a conflict or disagreement with over-
zealous, brutal or sadistic police officers."); Anthony S. Winer, Hate Crimes, Homosexuals, and
the Constitution, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 387, 401-17 (1994) (finding gay men and lesbians
among the most common victims of hate crimes).
Of course, one cannot deny the prevalence of minority victims harmed by police misconduct.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra, at 39 ("Race continues to play a central role in police brutal-
ity in the United States."); Hoffman, supra, at 1469 ("It is unusual to meet an African-American
or Latino male from Los Angeles who has not been singled out for attention, and often abuse, by
law enforcement officers because of his race."); Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse:
Why 42 US.C. § 1983 Is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 756
(1993) (describing the typical victim of police abuse as a young African-American or Latino
male who is poor and has a criminal record); Emily J. Sack, Police Approaches and Inquiries on
the Streets of New York: The Aftermath of People v. DeBour, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 512, 538 n.164
(1991) (finding race as a factor "overwhelmingly used against minorities, particularly Blacks and
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merous discussions on police discretion,6 the results from New York
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's "crack down" on crime, 7 and the reasons
for police abuse.8 As a result of these discussions and others arising
from the Rodney King beating, many have come to recognize the sys-
temic problem of unjust police officers. 9 This problem thus requires a
Hispanics" for determining when to stop an individual); Schwartz, supra, at 360 (observing that
African-Americans have a greater chance of being stopped and frisked than whites); Edward
Lewis, Policing the Police, ESSENCE, Nov. 1997; at 14, 14 (reporting from a 1996 Amnesty Inter-
national study that found more than two-thirds of police abuse victims to be racial minorities);
see also Judith Butler, Endangered/Endangering: Schematic Racism and White Paranoia, in
READING RODNEY KING, READING URBAN UPRISING 15, 18 (Robert Gooding-Williams ed.
1993) (illustrating the politicization of the black body as being dangerous). At the same time,
white Americans, in general, do not seem to perceive this disparity. When asked if the police in
their community ever treated blacks worse than whites, 67% of the white population responding
believed that the police have always treated both races equally. GALLUP Poll, Sept. 24, 1995,
available in WESTLAW, Poll Library, USGALLUP.950912 Q46 (1011 total respondents, 842
whites).
6. For example, criticism of New York City's Internal Affairs' failure to act on the Civilian
Complaint Review Board's complaints on police misconduct and brutality led a state lower court
to force the police department to allow the city's Public Advocate to examine officers' files when
the board presents complaints against them. Kit R. Roane, Public Advocate Wins a Look at
Suspected Officers' Files, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1997, at B3. This decision occurred despite Mayor
Giuliani's Commission to Combat Police Corruption's finding that 87% of Internal Affairs' com-
plaints were conducted satisfactorily. Id. Internal Affairs did not begin investigation of
Louima's case until 36 hours after the incident was reported. Lewis, supra note 5, at 14
("[Ilnvestigations into abuses remain shrouded in secrecy while internal disciplinary reports are
kept strictly confidential.").
7. While a 50% decrease in the city's crime rate occurred since 1990, the number of com-
plaints against the New York Police Department has increased by 56% from 1993 to 1996. Bad
Cops, Good Cops, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 8, 1997, at 7, 7 (arguing that present criticism of Mayor
Giuliani should not lead to "unpoliced criminality"). "Cops and liberties are not zero-sum rivals;
a strong and effective police force is not a corrupt or an abusive police force; good street policing
does not oppress and brutalize the poor: it benefits the poor, who are overwhelmingly the vic-
tims of street crime, above all." Id.; Only a Minority, supra note 1, at 19 (demonstrating that
approximately four out of five complaints are made by minorities); see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 5, at 39 ("In New York, complaints citywide rose more than 37 percent from 1993 to
1994, after the new police 'quality of life' initiatives took hold.").
8. See, e.g., Edward Conlon, Men in Blue: Why Do Cops Go Berserk?, NEW YORKER, Sept.
29, 1997, at 10, 10-11 (arguing that the analogous circumstances of war and police work demon-
strates similar psychological results and violent reactions).
This Comment will employ the following definition of police abuse: "any action by a police
officer without regard to motive, intent, or malice that tends to injure, insult, trespass upon
human dignity, manifest feelings of inferiority, and/or violate an inherent legal right of a member
of the police constituency in the course of performing 'police work."' Alexa P. Freeman, Un-
scheduled Departures: The Circumvention of Just Sentencing for Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS
L.J. 677, 685 (1996) (quoting Thomas Barker & David L. Carter, A Typology of Police Deviance,
in POLICE DEVIANCE 4, 7 (Thomas Barker & David L. Carter eds., 1991)). This definition recog-
nizes the broad scope of how officers can exceed their authority and physically, mentally, and
emotionally harm others. Id. at 686.
9. See, e.g., Giuliani Targeted in Protest Over Cops: N.Y. Mayor Feels Heat Over Alleged Bru-
tality, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 30, 1997, § 1 (quoting Richie Perez of the Congress of Puerto Rican
Rights as stating that Mayor Giuliani did not confront the systemic problem of police brutality);
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legal path open to victims that allows them to challenge police depart-
ments as contributors to their injuries.'0
In contrast to this necessary path, current legal doctrines impose a
strict, antiquated method for obtaining compensation resulting from
police abuse. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against state
and local officials who violate federal law. 1 The Supreme Court in-
terpreted this statute to allow suits against municipalities in certain
situations.' 2 Despite this opening of the statute, the Court erected
high hurdles that plaintiffs must clear in order to prevail in their cases
against local entities.' 3 A critical manifestation of these hurdles arose
in cases claiming a municipality's failure to train or supervise officers
adequately, as the Court required the responsible official to be "delib-
erately indifferent" to the problems that could occur.14
This Comment will explore the history of this judicial development
of § 1983 and demonstrate how the current standard of "deliberate
indifference" ignores social realities for cases involving supervisory of-
ficials who fail to prevent potential police abuse situations. Part I will
present a comprehensive explication of § 1983 doctrines for municipal
liability. After examining the history of the statute and its intended
purpose,15 this Part will focus on the Court's creation of municipal
liability' 6 and the various legal hurdles the Court formed to limit this
liability.' 7 Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v.
Brown"' presents the most recent example of the Court's adherence to
traditional formulas in the context of hiring an employee with a crimi-
nal background. As a result, this Part will provide a detailed examina-
tion of this case and its focus on the deliberate indifference standard.' 9
Part II will analyze the problems with the high deliberate indiffer-
ence standard in light of current battles police abuse victims face when
presenting a suit against municipalities. First, this Part will demon-
Kim, supra note 5, at A28; Clarence Page, Aggressive Policing, BAurIMORE SUN, Sept. 11, 1997,
at 15A (arguing that Mayor Giuliani failed to recognize the systemic problem of police abuse
and wrongfully asserted that the Louima incident was isolated).
10. This Comment will remain focused on the issue of municipal liability and only present
some legal problems with claims against individual officers for purposes of analyzing the Court's
reasoning.
11. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION § 8.1, at 422 (2d ed. 1994).
12. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see infra notes 38-65 and accom-
panying text.
13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 38-83 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 84-146 and accompanying text.
18. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
19. See infra notes 147-212 and accompanying text.
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strate the deficiencies of the deliberate indifference standard in the
context of Brown.20 This Part will then present the various legal
problems police abuse victims face in these situations and show how
the Court's stance in Brown failed to acknowledge these problems.21
Finally, a proposal for respondeat superior liability will be presented
as a more viable doctrine for compensating police abuse victims with-
out arbitrarily imposing costs on local entities.22
I. BACKGROUND
A. The History and Purpose of Section 1983
Title 42 U.S.C. § 198323 originated from the Civil Rights Act of
1871,24 which Congress intended to be "remedial" and "in aid of the
preservation of human liberty and human rights. '25 Specifically, the
rampant violence by the Ku Klux Klan in the South caused the Recon-
struction Congress to develop a way of enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment and impose federal intervention on abuses by state au-
thorities. 26 Congressional members recognized the threat to the fed-
eral-state balance resulting from this legislation but found the
20. See infra notes 218-52 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 253-85 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 286-301 and accompanying text.
23. The statute states, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
24. Enforcement (Ku Klux) Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. After the Civil War, the Recon-
struction Congress adopted, over President Andrew Johnson's veto, the Civil Rights Act of 1866
to counteract violence against African-Americans. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1679-81,
1809, 1861 (1866); see Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining
Monell in Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 510-12 (1993) (providing a history of the
Reconstruction Congress and the push to respond to the violence against African-Americans).
Congress then passed more powerful civil rights legislation based on the 1866 Act, including the
Enforcement Act of 1871. Id. at 512-13 n.61.
25. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 68 (1871) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
26. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 72
(1871) (statement of Rep. Blair) ("The courts are powerless to redress these wrongs, and the
State Governments fail to afford protection to the people.... In many instances [members of the
KKK] are the State authorities. And if you deny to the General Government the authority to
interfere, then there is no remedy anywhere."); id. at app. 78 (statement of Rep. Perry) ("Sher-
iffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear not; witnesses conceal the truth
or falsify it; grand and petit juries act as if they might be accomplices."). Congress acted in
response to President Grant's message recognizing the threat to "life and property" and recom-
mending legislation to protect these interests. Id. at 244.
790 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:785
desperate nature of contemporary conditions to require federal
action. 27
Given this historical context, the Court interpreted the statute to
provide a federal remedy when state laws failed to support theoretical
or practical solutions. 28 In Monroe v. Pape,29 the Court examined the
full legislative record and discerned three main goals for enacting the
statute: (1) to strike down state laws that denied citizens federal rights
and privileges; 30 (2) to provide a "remedy where state law was inade-
quate;"'31 and (3) "to provide a federal remedy where the state rem-
edy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice. '32
Later, the Court characterized the function of the statute as deterring
unconstitutional uses of state power. 33 As a result, the Court moved
beyond the specific attack against the Ku Klux Klan in 1871 and ap-
plied the statute's broad language to modern problems by allowing an
action against a local official's abuse of position.34
27. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., at app. 67 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger) ("The
measure is one, sir, which does affect the foundations of the Government itself, which goes to
every part of it, and touches the liberties and the rights of all the people, and doubtless the
destinies of the Union."); see also Randall R. Steichen, Comment, Municipal Liability Under
Section 1983 for Civil Rights Violations after Monell, 64 IowA L. REV. 1032, 1040-41 (1979)
(showing that "municipal apathy and tacit complicity" in contemporary violence remained the
legislation's focus). In addition, Congress passed this statute at a time when the common law
began to evolve and federal judicial power increased. Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y.
Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983's Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 766 (1992).
28. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173-74.
29. 365 U.S. 167.
30. Id. at 173.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 174.
33. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980).
34. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172. The case involved a complaint that 13 Chicago police officers
entered Monroe's home without a warrant, searched every room, and further infringed his rights
through interrogation at the police station for 10 hours. Id. at 169.
One may criticize the Court's broad reading as straying from the legislators' intent and thus
improperly expanding the role of federal courts. See, e.g., id. at 237 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Reconstruction Congress assumed that the states would "remain the primary
guardians" of individual rights and only allowed federal intervention when a specific state law,
custom, or usage barred relief). Regardless of the factual merits of this argument, the changing
needs in society, exemplified by the civil rights movements in the 1960s, support a more liberal
interpretation of the statute that requires balancing legislative intent against these needs. See
Gene R. Nichol, Jr.. Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REV. 959, 996 (1987)
("In the broadest terms, section 1983 was designed to provide a federal cause of action that
assures state constitutional compliance. It is certainly possible ... that if the statute is inter-
preted in too intrusive a fashion, the final result would be a remedy that is less rather than more
effective.").
Indeed, one must recognize that defining legislative intent necessarily includes the inter-
preter's perspective within the context of current social relations and power structures. Richard
A. Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the Court's Historical Analy-
sis, 40 ARK. L. REv. 741, 787 (1987) ("[Personal] values shape the very context in which history
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In contrast to this expansive reading, Monroe also excluded munici-
palities from liability.35 By examining the legislative history of the Ku
Klux Act, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to hold
municipalities liable for officers' violations of the statute. 36 While this
reading soon reached a critical reexamination, the decision to treat
municipalities differently than individual officers pervaded all of the
Court's later decisions.37
B. The Overruling of Monroe's Immunity of Municipalities
Seventeen years later, the Court readdressed the role of municipali-
ties in a § 1983 claim and overruled the holding in Monroe that they
is perceived."); see MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND
OTHER WRMNGS 1972-1977, at 133 (Colin Gordon ed. 1980) ("'Truth' is linked in a circular
relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it
induces and which extend it."). Furthermore, interpreting a statute involves a dialectic between
the interpreter's views of legislative history, prior application of the statute, and current norms
and values. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 58-64 (1994)
(discussing the "hermeneutic" process of interpretation); Matasar, supra, at 790 (arguing that
current policy justifications must fill in the gaps where history will not aid interpretation).
35. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
36. Id. at 190. Just before the Senate voted on the Act, Senator Sherman introduced an
amendment to the bill to provide liability against any inhabitant of a county, city, or parish for
injuries resulting from a riot. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871). Compensation in
this amendment consisted of damages against the county, city, or parish in which the riot oc-
curred. Id. Senator Sherman drafted this amendment to support civil rights actions against dam-
age from the Ku Klux Klan by holding "the people of property in the southern States"
responsible. Id. at 761. Since the House of Representatives rejected the Sherman amendment,
the Court in Monroe determined that Congress did not intend to impose any liability against a
municipality when enacting the Civil Rights Act. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190.
Many commentators argue that Monroe transformed § 1983 into a "tort-like" statute. Charles
F. Abernathy, Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts, 77 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1447 (1989) ("Monroe
created a regime in which constitutional enforcement (or restitution) would depend upon hold-
ing individuals responsible."); Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Consti-
tution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1722-30 (1989) (arguing that the Court decided Monroe based
on "constitutional rhetoric," while tort language permeated the opinion). Cf. Jack M. Beer-
mann, Common Law Elements of the Section 1983 Action, 72 CHI.-KENT L. Rev. 695, 707 (1997)
("When the Court decides an issue primarily upon the weight of nineteenth century authority, it
misses the point that principles underlying § 1983 should be the primary source of guidance on
matters not fully addressed in the statutory language."); Nahmod, supra, at 1742 (demonstrating
that the Court "marginalizes" the statute by focusing on tort rhetoric); Christina Brooks Whit-
man, Emphasizing the Constitutional in Constitutional Torts, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 661, 667
(1997) (arguing that Monroe provided a new remedy only for constitutional violations, but
should not "be seen as the vehicle for rethinking the substance of constitutional law"). This use
of tort principles marks a monumental and problematic direction in constitutional law. Aberna-
thy, supra, at 1483 (finding lower courts' focus on tort phrases over primary constitutional issues
causing difficulties in proper interpretations).
37. lb MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION § 7.1, at 2 (3d
ed. 1997) (stating that a defendant's liability will be determined based on the Court's develop-
ment of rules on legal responsibility); see infra Parts I.B to I.E.
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must remain immune. 38 In Monell v. Department of Social Services,39
female employees of New York City's Department of Social Services
and Board of Education brought an action against the city for having
an official policy of compelling pregnant employees to take unpaid
leaves of absence before medical necessity required them to stop
working. 40 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals denied the employ-
ees relief, as Monroe precluded liability against the municipality.41
1. A New Historical Picture
The Court fully explored the history behind the Civil Rights Act
and the Sherman Amendment42 and concluded that congressional
members could foresee liability against municipalities when approving
the Act.43 First, the Court found that supporters of the amendment
believed that remedies against municipalities could ensure protection
for individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment. 44 By contrast, op-
ponents to the amendment argued that the federal government could
not constitutionally require local governments to enforce the law
against citizens, and thus the creation of a remedy imposed too much
obligation upon municipalities. 45 Despite their opposition, these
members could perceive the distinction between the federal govern-
ment creating new obligations on municipalities and imposing liability
against municipalities that fail to conform to state law.46
In addition to the debates on the Sherman Amendment, the Court
analyzed jurisprudence at the time of the Act and found support for
establishing municipal liability. 47 Federal courts at the time of the
Civil Rights Act had the power to enforce the Constitution against
38. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978).
39. 436 U.S. 658.
40. Id. at 660-61. The district court held the plaintiffs' claims moot, as the city changed the
policy to only force a pregnant employee to leave her job when she became medically unable to
perform her job. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 394 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
The plaintiffs argued that they deserved backpay, but the court found Monroe precluded liability
against the city. Id.
41. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 532 F.2d 259, 265 (2d Cir. 1976). The court of ap-
peals held that the individual board members could be held liable as "persons" under § 1983, but
the city would ultimately have to pay damages, and this result would contradict Monroe. Id. at
264-65.
42. See supra note 36 for an explanation of the Sherman Amendment.
43. Monell, 436 U.S. at 665-90.
44. Id. at 672 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 751, 760 (1871) (statements of Rep.
Shellabarger & Sen. Sherman)).
45. Id. at 673-74 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 795 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Blair)).
46. Id. at 679-80 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 794-95 (1871) (statements of
Reps. Poland & Burchard)).
47. Id. at 680-81.
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municipalities that violated federal rights.48 As a result, congressional
members could foresee courts enforcing the Act against local entities
that violated federal constitutional rights. The Court also found that
the members who supported the Civil Rights Act rejected the Sher-
man Amendment.49 This distinction supported the Court's belief that
congressional members perceived the constitutionality of imposing lia-
bility on municipalities without resorting to the amendment's reme-
dies against local entities for other individuals' acts.50 Furthermore,
supporters emphasized the remedial nature of the Act and indicated
that the "largest latitude consistent with the words employed" applied
to the Act.51
Given this new light on the historical environment surrounding
§ 1983, the Court interpreted the word "person" in the statute to in-
clude municipal entities as well as officials.52 Hence, the stance in
Monroe against municipal liability no longer applied, and the general
principle of providing a federal remedy for abuses without state solu-
tions extended beyond individual officials' actions. The Court, how-
ever, provided an additional "sketch" for instituting a § 1983 cause of
action against a municipality.5 3
2. The Limitation of the New Doctrine
While expanding § 1983 to include municipalities, the Court ex-
plained in dictum that municipal liability would not entail a respon-
deat superior theory.54 By again examining the legislative history, the
Court found that "Congress did not intend municipalities to be held
48. Id. Specifically, the Court during the middle of the nineteenth century enforced the Con-
tract Clause against municipalities and provided "'positive' relief" by requiring that they levy
taxes to discharge court judgments. Id. at 681; see id. at 673 n.28 (listing cases during 1860s that
enforced the Contract Clause).
49. Monell, 436 U.S. at 682.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 684 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 68 (statement of Rep. Shel-
labarger)); see id. at 686-87 (explaining that Rep. Bingham drafted section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to redress government takings of property and intended section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act to provide civil remedies based on the Fourteenth Amendment).
52. Id. at 683.
[S]ince municipalities through their official acts could, equally with natural persons,
create the harms intended to be remedied by § 1, and, further, since Congress intended
§ 1 to be broadly construed, there is no reason to suppose that municipal corporations
would have been excluded from the sweep of § 1.
Id. at 685-86. The Court reinforced this conclusion with case law from the early nineteenth
century that defined "person" as including corporations. Id. at 687-88. In addition, an act of
Congress passed months before the Civil Rights Act defined "person" as applying to all "politic
and corporate" bodies. Id. at 688 (citing Act of Feb. 25, 1871, § 2, 16 Stat. 431 (1871)).
53. Id. at 695.
54. Id. at 691-95.
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liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some na-
ture caused a constitutional tort. '55 Specifically, the Court explained
that proponents of respondeat superior liability advocate the ideals of
reducing accidents and spreading the cost across the public.56 Oppo-
nents of the Sherman Amendment failed to accept similar reasons for
passing the amendment, however, because they argued federal affirm-
ative obligations imposed upon municipalities would transgress consti-
tutional boundaries.57 As a result, municipal liability would need to
avoid vicarious liability to conform to Congress's intentions.58
The language of § 1983, the Court also found, denotes the need for
a causal link between the municipality's regulation 59 and the victim's
violated rights.60 This language requires that the offender "subject"
the victim to, or cause him or her "to be subjected" 61 to, a deprivation
of his or her constitutional rights pursuant to the regulation. 62
Presented With this formulation, the drafters' intention appears to re-
55. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
56. Id. at 693-94.
57. Id. at 694 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 777, 792 (1871) (statements of Sen.
Frelinghuysen & Rep. Butler)).
58. Curiously, the Court did not address case law at the time that would support a respondeat
superior theory of liability. Early nineteenth century cases commonly held municipalities liable
for their employees' torts. See Charles A. Rothfeld, Comment, Section 1983 Municipal Liability
and the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 956-57 & n.97 (1979) (provid-
ing an extensive list of cases in support of this principle). By 1871, however, courts accepted a
distinction between public and private activities that established immunity for government enti-
ties when employees engaged in "public" activities. Id. at 957 n.99 ("The origin of the distinction
may lie, in part, in the confusion between nonliable unincorporated governmental units and fully
liable municipal corporations."). At the same time, respondeat superior liability applied to "pro-
prietary" or "corporate" activities. Id. at 957. See also infra note 74 for more cases enforcing
respondeat superior liability during the late 1860s and early 1870s. Many have also criticized the
Court's interpretation of the legislative history that led to precluding respondeat superior liabil-
ity. See Karen M. Blum, From Monroe to MonelL' Defining the Scope of Municipal Liability in
Federal Courts, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 409, 413 n.15 (1978) (arguing that congressional members did not
debate a federal remedy on local governmental units when they had an obligation under state
law to perform peacekeeping tasks); Susanah M. Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability:
The Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 517, 532-38 (1987) (distinguish-
ing rejection of the Sherman Amendment as municipal liability for actions by private citizens
from vicarious liability for unconstitutional acts by municipal employees); Eric M. Hellige, Note,
Monell v. Department of Social Services: One Step Forward and a Half Step Back for Municipal
Liability Under Section 1983, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 893, 913-14 (1979) (criticizing the Court for
ignoring the possibilities that Congress believed a duty could be imposed on every citizen to
police the contemporary violence and if the municipality had a duty to provide protection and
failed to do so, respondeat superior liability would likely result).
59. The Court labeled the statute's listing of "regulation, custom, or usage" as the municipal-
ity's "official policy." Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
60. Id. at 692.
61. The Court examined the statute as originally passed, which used "shall subject" rather
than "subjects." Id. at 691.
62. Id. at 692.
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quire that the entity's regulation caused the offender to violate the
victim's rights.63 The Court interpreted this causation element as oc-
curring when "execution of a government's policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be
said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury. ' 64 Since the city in
this case instituted an official policy of compelling pregnant employ-
ees to take unnecessary leaves of absence without pay, the city re-
mained liable for the constitutional violation. 65
C. Qualified Immunity Defense Unavailable for Municipalities
In Owen v. City of Independence,66 the Court began to define the
contours of municipal liability set out in Monell and rejected a quali-
fied immunity defense for government entities.67 A police chief
brought an action under § 1983 against the city for discharging his em-
ployment without notice of reasons or a hearing, in violation of proce-
dural and substantive due process rights. 68 The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals found that the city possessed a right to qualified immunity
based on the good faith of the officials involved. 69
The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's creation of a qualified im-
munity defense by interpreting the statute again in light of historical
tradition as well as modern social policy.70 Several recent cases relied
on traditional common law to establish immunity for various state and
local officials.71 Supplied with this continual recognition of these im-
munities, the Court construed § 1983 to incorporate immunities that
the common law clearly established when these immunities con-
formed to the purpose of the Civil Rights Act.72 In contrast to certain
63. Id.
64. Id. at 694. For a much broader interpretation of this language, see Mead, supra note 58, at
532-35 (arguing that the passive voice indicates a requirement of responsibility for the constitu-
tional harm, allowing respondeat superior liability to control this responsibility).
65. Monel, 436 U.S. at 694-95.
66. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
67. Id. at 638.
68. Id. at 630.
69. Id. at 634.
70. Id. at 650.
71. Id. at 637; see, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (finding qualified immunity
for prison officials and officers); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (finding absolute im-
munity for prosecutors); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (finding qualified immu-
nity for superintendent of state hospital); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (finding
qualified immunity for local school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)
(finding qualified good faith immunity for state government and other executive officers for
discretionary acts); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (establishing absolute immunity for
judges).
72. Owen, 445 U.S. at 638.
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local officials, municipal corporations do not possess a tradition of im-
munity from damages for statutory and constitutional violations.73 In
fact, many cases during the middle of the nineteenth century
"awarded damages against municipalities for violations expressly
found to have been committed in good faith."'74
While historical doctrines allowed immunity for municipalities, the
Court discovered that modern needs could no longer support these
doctrines.75 Even though traditional common law did not recognize
absolute immunity for municipalities, courts frequently distinguished
between governmental and proprietary functions, allowing immunity
for the former based on a theory that the municipality existed as an
"arm of the state."'76 Since states no longer enjoy absolute immunity,
the Court found that this theory did not apply to afford municipal
immunity.77 Courts also allowed immunity for officials' discretionary
acts, as opposed to ministerial acts, based on a theory of separation of
powers between government entities and the judicial branch. 78 When
a violation of federal rights occurs, however, "a municipality has no
'discretion' to violate the Federal Constitution; its dictates are abso-
lute and imperative. ''79
Public policy concerns compelled the Court to depart from histori-
cal doctrines and reject the defense of good faith for municipal corpo-
rations. 80 First, many victims would not possess a remedy if the city
73. Id.
74. Id. at 642; see, e.g., Hawks v. Charlemont, 107 Mass. 414 (1871) (holding a town liable for
men selected to repair highways and bridges who took stones from the plaintiff's property, re-
sulting in the washing away of parts of the plaintiff's land); Billings v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 329
(1869) (holding a municipality liable for allowing defective building eaves to accumulate water
on a sidewalk, leading to the plaintiff's injuries when she slipped on the icy walkway); Horton v.
Inhabitants of Ipswich, 66 Mass. 488 (1853) (holding a town liable for a snow-filled highway
causing injury to the plaintiff when he did not have knowledge of the danger and used reason-
able care); Elliot v. Concord, 27 N.H. 204 (1853) (holding a town liable for the plaintiff's injuries
sustained from an obstruction to a highway when town employees were constructing a railroad);
Lee v. Village of Sandy Hill, 40 N.Y. 442 (1869) (allowing the plaintiff to maintain a trespass
action against the village for his torn-down fence when the village trustees mistakenly believed
the fence encroached on the street); Town Council v. McComb, 18 Ohio 229 (1849) (holding a
town council liable for excavating the ground in front of the plaintiff's house, resulting in the
decrease in value of the house); Squiers v. Village of Neenah, 24 Wis. 588 (1869) (holding a
village liable for opening a street on the plaintiff's land without his consent); Hurley v. Town of
Texas, 20 Wis. 665 (1866) (holding a town liable for improperly taxing the plaintiff's logs when
they were retained in town before being sent to another town).
75. Owen, 445 U.S. at 651.
76. Id. at 644-45.
77. Id. at 645-46.
78. Id. at 648.
79. Id. at 649.
80. The Court's policy approach departs from the strict adherence to historical interpretation
in Monell. Mead, supra note 58, at 547.
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possessed this defense.81 Furthermore, imposing liability on the city
serves as a deterrent against future violations, as this creates an incen-
tive to protect rights and develop internal rules and programs. 82 The
public also benefits from the government's activities, and thus holding
the public responsible for the entity's management seems appropriate
and better than making the victim bear the loss. 83
D. The Court's Limitations on Municipal Liability
After the Court created expansive readings of the statute in
Monroe, Monell, and Owen, the rising number of cases brought under
§ 1983 filled federal dockets. 84 This high amount of litigation led to a
series of particularized limitations on actions against municipalities. 85
As will be explained in Part I.D.1, the Court's initial step precluded
obtaining punitive damages against a municipality under the statute.
In addition, the Court further analyzed the policy requirement left
open to interpretation in Monell. 86 The Court later established two
versions of the municipality's role in the victim's deprivation of consti-
tutional rights.8 7 As shall be discussed in Part I.D.2, when a municipal
"policymaker" violates federal law, his or her action satisfies the pol-
icy requirement. If the municipality fails to take any affirmative ac-
tion, as explored in Part I.D.3, and the policymaker remains
"deliberately indifferent" to the need to act, the Court will find a suffi-
cient nexus between the failure to act and the victim's deprivation of
rights. Part I.D.4 will show that the Court also reexamined federalism
concerns and gave more deference to state law in defining when poli-
cymaking authority occurs.
1. A Victim Cannot Obtain Punitive Damages Against a
Municipality Under § 1983
The Court, in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,88 reversed the
First Circuit's decision to allow compensatory and punitive damages
against the city after it attempted to block Blood, Sweat, and Tears
from playing at the plaintiff's jazz concert. 89 While Fact Concerts
eventually obtained a restraining order against the city and included
81. Owen, 445 U.S. at 651.
82. Id. at 651-52.
83. Id. at 655.
84. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 8.2, at 428.
85. Mead, supra note 58, at 521-22.
86. See infra Parts I.D.2 to I.D.4.
87. See infra Parts I.D.2 to I.D.3.
88. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
89. Id. at 271.
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the group in the concert, it sold fewer than half of the tickets. 90 As a
result, the district court allowed punitive damages against city officials
as deterrence against future misconduct and promotion of accounta-
bility for the next election.91
From a historical perspective, the district court's decision deviated
from traditional doctrines. By 1871, a victim could sue a municipality
for tortious conduct but not for punitive damages. 92 Courts distin-
guished between compensating for injuries and punishing for bad-
faith conduct to preclude the public from receiving punishment and
imposing undue burdens on taxpayers when courts held the munici-
pality liable to benefit the public. 93 Moreover, the Sherman Amend-
ment only considered compensatory damages for constitutional
violations.94
In addition to this deviance from historical practices, the Court also
perceived a fundamental unfairness in imposing punitive damages on
municipalities. 95 Punitive damages punish one who intentionally or
maliciously wrongs another. 96 A municipality, however, "can have no
malice independent of the malice of its officials."'97 The Court further
found that the deterrence function of these damages, as another justi-
fication, did not appear effective when the punishment on the entity
will probably not deter individual officers. 98 Furthermore, compensa-
tory damages serve enough of a function of public shame, making pu-
nitive damages unnecessary. 99
90. Id. at 252.
91. Id. at 254.
92. Id. at 259-60.
93. Id. at 263; see, e.g., City Council v. Gilmer & Taylor, 33 Ala. 116 (1858); City of Chicago v.
Langlass, 52 I11. 256 (1869); McGary v. City of Lafayette, 12 Rob. 668 (La. 1846); Woodman v.
Nottingham, 49 N.H. 387 (1870); Order of Hermits v. County of Philadelphia, 4 Clark 120,
Brightly N.P. 116 (Pa. 1847).
94. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 264-65 (quoting Rep. Butler, CoNo. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
792 (1871) ("[W]e do not look upon [the Sherman amendment] as a punishment.... It is a
mutual insurance.")).
95. Id. at 267.
96. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979); 2 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL.,
THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 8.45, at 802 (1985) ("Exemplary, or punitive, damages are
generally defined or described as damages which are given as an enhancement of compensatory
damages because of the wanton, reckless, malicious, or oppressive character of the acts com-
plained of.").
97. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267.
98. Id. at 268-69.
99. Id. at 269.
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2. An Act by a Municipal Policymaker
In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,100 the Court allowed liability
against a municipality when a policymaker's single decision caused the
victim's injury. In response to Dr. Pembaur's refusal to let officers
enter his clinic and serve capiases' 01 on two of his employees, deputy
sheriffs contacted their supervisor for instructions.10 2 The supervisor
directed them to call the county prosecutor, 10 3 who told the officers to
"'go in and get [the witnesses].'"04 After the doctor continued to
refuse access to them, the officers obtained an axe and chopped down
the door.'0 5 Dr. Pembaur brought a § 1983 action against the city and
county for violating a Fourth Amendment requirement that the of-
ficers obtain a search warrant to execute an arrest warrant for a third
person.10 6 The Court reviewed only his claim against the county. 0 7
The Court found that an "official policy" did not remain limited to
written rules determined by a municipal board. 10 8 A policy could also
include a particular course of action "properly made by [the] govern-
ment's authorized decisionmakers."' 0 9 Furthermore, this action could
constitute a single instance rather than repeated occurrences, as the
purpose of § 1983 dictates compensation for all victims. 110 The Court
relied on Owen and Fact Concerts to support this possibility."' The
issue of whether an official possesses final policymaking authority,
however, remains a question of state law.112 Because the Sixth Circuit
100. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
101. A capias is "a writ of attachment commanding a county official to bring a subpoenaed
witness who has failed to appear before the court to testify and to answer for civil contempt."
Id. at 472 n.1.
102. Id. at 472-73.
103. Id. at 473. The deputy sheriffs actually contacted the assistant prosecutor, who conferred
with the county prosecutor and relayed the statement to the sheriffs. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 474. The Fourth Amendment requirement derives from Steagald v.
United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (requiring police officers to obtain a search warrant to execute
an arrest warrant for the arrestee when entering a third person's home), decided the day after
Pembaur filed his lawsuit. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 474.
107. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 477. While the district court dismissed his claim against both de-
fendants, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal against the city by finding the
city's policy unconstitutional. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 746 F.2d 337, 341-42 (6th Cir.
1984).
108. Pernbaur, 475 U.S. at 480.
109. Id. at 480-81.
110. Id. at 481.
111. Id. at 480 ("[Elven a single decision by [a municipal] body unquestionably constitutes an
act of official government policy.").
112. Id. at 483. The Court reaffirmed this view and determined that courts should decide if an
official constitutes a final decisionmaker as a matter of law. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.,
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concluded that the prosecutor could establish county policy under
Ohio law, the prosecutor acted as the final decisionmaker, and thus
the county could be held liable.113
Despite this strong holding against the municipality, a plurality of
the Court limited liability to situations where the decisionmaker
makes a "deliberate choice to follow a course of action." 114 Justice
Stevens concurred in the judgment but did not join this part of the
decision, as he argued that Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act with
the intention of holding municipalities vicariously liable for resulting
constitutional deprivations.1 15 By contrast, Justice O'Connor rejected
the plurality's view, fearing that courts may misinterpret the standard
"to expose municipalities to liability beyond that envisioned by the
Court" in Monell.116
3. The Deliberate Indifference Standard
The Court resisted extending the policy doctrine to a single incident
of wrongdoing in two recent cases, City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle 1 7
and City of Canton v. Harris."8 Both of these cases involved § 1983
claims based on the municipalities' failure to train their employees
adequately, which resulted in the deprivation of the plaintiffs'
rights.' 19
In Tuttle, a plurality of four justices rejected a § 1983 claim alleging
one incident of excessive force.' 20 A police officer fatally shot Tuttle
when he reached down toward his boot after the officer ordered him
to halt.' 2' Tuttle's widow brought an action against the city for failing
to adequately train the officer, thereby violating Tuttle's right to due
process.' 22 The Court overturned the jury's verdict, asserting that a
factfinder could not infer from one instance of excessive force that
inadequate training or "supervision amounting to 'deliberate indiffer-
491 U.S. 701 (1989) (holding that the identification of officials whose decisions represent official
policy remains a legal question determined by the judge); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485
U.S. 112 (1988) (plurality opinion) (finding no delegation of final policymaking authority when
officials have discretion in their decisions).
113. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 484-85.
114. Id. at 483-84 (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985)). The
plurality consisted of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id. at 470.
115. Id. at 489 (Stevens, J., concurring); see supra note 58 for the basis for Stevens's argument.
116. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 491 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
117. 471 U.S. 808.
118. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
119. Harris, 489 U.S. at 382-83; Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 812-13.
120. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 821. The plurality consisted of Justice Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger,
Justice White, and Justice O'Connor. Id. at 810.
121. Id. at 811.
122. Id. at 811-12.
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ence"' caused the incident. 123 As a foundation, the plaintiff had to
establish that a municipal policymaker acted to implicate the munici-
pality's role. 124 Since the policy at issue did not in itself offend the
Constitution, "there must [have been] an affirmative link between the
policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged.'
12 5
The Court extended this reasoning to limit the definition of "delib-
erate indifference" in Harris.'26 Officers brought Harris to the city
police department, where she slumped to the floor two times.' 2 7 After
they let her lie on the floor for an hour, the officers took her to a
nearby hospital.' 28 As a result, she remained hospitalized for a week
and received outpatient treatment for a year. 129 Harris filed a § 1983
suit against the city for violating her due process right to receive nec-
essary medical attention, and she presented evidence that shift com-
manders did not receive adequate training to determine when a
detainee required medical care. 130
Relying on the requirement in Monell that the municipal policy
must constitute the moving force behind the constitutional violation,
the Court established a strict standard for failure to train cases.' 3' A
plaintiff must show that the municipality made a deliberate or con-
scious choice in failing to implement an adequate training program.
132
As a result, courts must focus on the "adequacy of the training pro-
gram in relation to the tasks the particular officers perform" when
determining if deliberate indifference exists.' 33 This standard, how-
ever, does not rely upon the degree of culpability that the plaintiff
may need to establish when claiming a constitutional violation.
134
123. Id. at 821.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 823.
126. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-92 (1989).
127. Id. at 381.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 381-82.
131. Id. at 389. One should note that the Court stated that the "first inquiry" in a municipal
liability case remains "whether there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom
and the alleged constitutional violation." Id. at 385. This language derives from the plurality's
decision in Tuttle. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text. Hence, the Court affirmed
this standard. See 1 IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 1:05, at 58 (1996) ("[The Court] clarified that plaintiffs
carry a heavy burden of proving the inadequacy [of a training program] is flagrant and can be
directly linked to the conduct which caused the injury.").
132. Harris, 489 U.S. at 389.
133. Id. at 390.
134. Id. at 388 n.8 ("[T]he proper standard for determining when a municipality will be liable
under § 1983 for constitutional wrongs does not turn on any underlying culpability test that de-
termines when such wrongs have occurred.").
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4. Adherence to State Law as a Proper Remedy
When initially interpreting § 1983, the Court found that the federal
statute supplemented state law and allowed for a separate legal rem-
edy independent of state remedies. 135 Recently, however, a majority
of the Court has focused on federalism issues and allowed state law to
determine the threshold question of when policymaking authority oc-
curs.136 This approach occurred in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik137
and Jett v. Dallas Independent School District.138
Praprotnik dealt with an architect's § 1983 claim against the city for
a detrimental job transfer after he successfully appealed a finding that
he wrongfully accepted outside employment without prior approval
from the city. 139 A plurality of the Court held that since local law
gave the city's Civil Service Commission the power to review person-
nel actions, the city's transfer could not be regarded as a final govern-
ment policy. 140 Relying on Pembaur, the plurality remained
"confident that state law ... will always direct a court to some official
or body that has the responsibility for making law or setting policy in
any given area of local government's business."' 141 As a result, the
plaintiff needed to establish how the local law empowered the person-
nel director who transferred him with the final policymaking
authority.142
135. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
136. See infra notes 139-46 and accompanying text. The Court also addressed this issue in
McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997), which held that the county sheriff was the
official policymaker for the state, rather than the county, on law enforcement issues. Id. at 785.
Relying on the Alabama constitution and statutes on the sheriff's functions, the Court found that
the sheriff represented the state when executing law enforcement duties. Id. at 785-90. This
decision has also had a profound effect on the lower courts. See, e.g., Turquitt v. Jefferson
County, 137 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir. 1998) (overruling prior precedent for holding a county
liable due to improper operation or negligent supervision of a jail when state law assigned such
responsibilities to the sheriff).
137. 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
138. 491 U.S. 701 (1989).
139. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 114-16.
140. Id. at 128-29 (O'Connor, J., Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., & Scalia, J.).
141. Id. at 125. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun, concurred
in the decision holding that the personnel director did not act as a final decisionmaker but criti-
cized the plurality's view that state or local law should be the determining factor in deciding this
issue. Id. at 140-45 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he law is concerned not with the niceties of
legislative draftsmanship but with the realities of municipal decisionmaking, and any assessment
of a municipality's actual power structure is necessarily a factual and practical one."). In support
of Brennan's position, see Peter H. Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Some Les-
sons from Tort Law and Organization Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 1753, 1774-78 (1989) (arguing that
the Court applies a "pyramidal model" of local policymaking structures that ignores the way
low-level officials interact with the public and define policy).
142. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 131. The plurality's view appears to derive from Justice Frank-
furter's dissent in Monroe, which interprets the history of § 1983 as limiting federal action to
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A majority of the Court in Jett affirmed the plurality's holding in
Praprotnik that the trial judge must determine the officials with poli-
cymaking authority based on "relevant legal materials" and a munici-
pality's "custom or usage. ' 143 Jett presented an action under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981144 and 1983 for racial discrimination and loss of his
position as a school athletic director. 145 The Court rejected the dis-
trict court's assertion that municipal liability under § 1981 could pro-
ceed based on respondeat superior and found that the same analysis
for liability must occur as in § 1983.146 The Court thus preserved ide-
als of federalism in construing the civil rights statutes.
E. Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown 147
1. Deliberate Indifference Analysis for a Single Hiring Decision
The most recent examination of the deliberate indifference standard
occurred in Brown.148 Victim Jill Brown initiated this case against a
Bryan County police officer and the county itself based on a reserve
areas where state law "authorized" infringements of constitutional rights. Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 224-37 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Congress by § [1983] created a civil liabil-
ity enforceable in the federal courts only in instances of injury for which redress was barred in
the state courts because some 'statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage' sanctioned the
grievance complained of.").
143. Jett, 491 U.S. at 737 (O'Connor, J., Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., Scalia, J., & Kennedy, J.).
144. Section 1981(a) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evi-
dence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punish-
ment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994). A remedy under this statute is distinct from one under § 1983. Cit-
ron v. Jackson State Univ., 456 F. Supp. 3, 10 (S.D. Miss. 1977), affd, 577 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir.
1978). While § 1983 is only addressed to those acting under color of state authority, § 1981
extends to acts of private discrimination. Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1031 (3d Cir. 1977).
145. Jet, 491 U.S. at 707-08. Jett, a white male, had many conflicts with the school's new
African-American principal and made several comments about the composition of African-
American students on the football team. Id. at 705-06. The principal met with other officials in
the district and dismissed Jett from his position as athletic director and head football coach. Id.
at 706.
146. Id. at 736. Justice Scalia distinguished his justification for upholding this result from the
plurality's focus on legislative history. Based on a cannon-of construction that "the specific gov-
erns the general," Justice Scalia found that the more detailed § 1983 governed the more general
§ 1981. Id. at 738-39 (Scalia, J., concurring). The plurality examined the debates on the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, the legislation leading to § 1981, and determined that the legislators did not
intend to reverse prior Supreme Court precedent "holding that federal duties could not be im-
posed on state instrumentalities by rendering them vicariously liability [sic] for the violations of
others." Id. at 729.
147. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
148. Id. at 397.
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deputy's use of excessive force and unlawful arrest.149 Brown and her
husband approached a police checkpoint on the border of Oklahoma
when driving from Texas. 1 0 Mr. Brown decided to return back to
Texas after seeing the checkpoint, 151 and two police officers (the dep-
uty sheriff and a reserve deputy) followed him after witnessing him
turn away.152 The officers stopped Mr. Brown four miles south of the
checkpoint, and the deputy sheriff ordered the Browns out of their
vehicle. 153 When Mrs. Brown failed to exit the vehicle, Reserve Dep-
uty Burns applied an "arm bar" technique by grabbing her wrist and
elbow, pulling her from the vehicle, and spinning her to the ground. 54
Mrs. Brown suffered knee injuries that later required corrective
surgery.155
Deputy Burns, Mrs. Brown eventually discovered, possessed a de-
tailed criminal record of arrests and convictions before obtaining his
position for the county.' 56 His record consisted of assault and battery,
resisting arrest, public drunkenness, driving while intoxicated, false
identification, driving with a suspended license, and nine moving traf-
fic violations. 57 In addition, an outstanding warrant for his arrest ex-
isted for violating probation and failing to perform required
community service.' 58 Despite Sheriff Moore's possession of this rec-
ord, the sheriff decided to hire Burns, a member of the family. 59
Mrs. Brown brought this case under § 1983, alleging that Burns ap-
plied excessive force and that Bryan County should be held liable for
this force for inadequately hiring and training Burns. 60 Bryan
149. Brown v. Board of County Comm'rs, 67 F.3d 1174, 1177 (5th Cir. 1995).
150. Id. at 400.
151. Id. Mr. Brown testified that he turned away from the checkpoint because prior unneces-
sary detentions lasted up to 15 minutes and caused problems with other deputies. Brief for
Respondent at 5 n.6, Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (No. 95-1100).
152. Brown, 67 F.3d at 1177.
153. Id. at 1177-78.
154. Id. at 1178. According to Mrs. Brown's testimony, she began to exit the truck, but Dep-
uty Burns grabbed her before she had an opportunity to do so. Id. at 1179. By contrast, Burns
testified that she leaned forward in the truck, which led him to believe that she was reaching for
a weapon. Id.
155. Id. at 1178. Medical testimony at trial demonstrated that Mrs. Brown would eventually
need total knee replacements. Id. at 1178 n.5.
156. Id. at 1183.
157. Id.
158. Brief for Respondent at 1-2, Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (No. 95-1100).
159. Brown, 67 F.3d at 1183-84. Burns was the son of Sheriff Moore's nephew, and Burns's
grandfather had worked in the police department for over 16 years. Id. at 1184. Sheriff Moore
testified that he had actual knowledge about some of the charges, but "never noticed" most of
them nor attempted to investigate the status of the charges at the time of his decision. Id.
160. Id. at 1177, 1182. She also asserted that Deputy Burns arrested her without probable
cause. Id. at 1180. The jury found for the plaintiff on these issues, did not provide Deputy Burns
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County stipulated that Sheriff Moore, the person who hired Burns,
acted as the policymaker for the county in the sheriff's department.
a61
The jury found Burns liable for applying excessive force and the
county's hiring and training policies "so inadequate as to amount to
deliberate indifference" of Brown's constitutional rights. 162 The
Supreme Court addressed only the claim based on Sheriff Moore's
hiring decision.' 63
In a five to four decision, the Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's judg-
ment for Brown and remanded the case based on Brown's failure to
show that Moore's hiring decision "reflected a conscious disregard for
a high risk that Burns would use excessive force in violation of
[Brown's] federally protected right."'1 64 Justice O'Connor, writing for
the Court, argued that a single hiring decision could constitute a mu-
nicipal policy only if a reasonable policymaker, after examining the
applicant's background, could perceive the "plainly obvious conse-
quence" that a deprivation of federal rights would occur if he or she
hires the applicant. 165
After clearly establishing that Monell did not allow a respondeat
superior theory of liability against a municipality, the Court stated
that a plaintiff must show that the municipal action possesses the "req-
uisite degree of culpability" and that a direct causal link exists be-
tween the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.
1 66
Since Moore's hiring decision in itself did not constitute an illegal
with qualified immunity, and awarded the plaintiff punitive damages. Id. at 1180. The Fifth
Circuit upheld the jury's findings but did not reverse the district court's dismissal of loss of
income and future earning capacity damages. Id. at 1181.
161. Id. at 1182.
162. Id. at 1184-85. Prior to the verdict, the county moved for summary judgment by arguing
that a municipality cannot be held liable for a single hiring decision, but the district court denied
this motion. Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 401-02 (1997).
163. Brown, 520 U.S. at 402. In response to the county's appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. Brown, 67 F.3d at 1182-85. The Fifth Circuit did
not examine the factual issue of the county's liability for inadequate training, but it did find the
county liable based on the hiring decision. Brown, 520 U.S. at 402.
164. Brown, 520 U.S. at 415-16.
165. Id. at 412-13. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice
Thomas joined this opinion. Id. at 399.
166. Id. at 404. The Court appears to equate the culpability requirement to the "deliberate"
test, while naming the "moving force" requirement as a direct causal link analysis. See
SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 37, §§ 7.7, 7.12 (suggesting that the deliberate indifference
standard determines the level of fault needed to show municipal responsibility and that the
Court's phrases of "moving force" and "direct causal link" require the policy to be the proximate
cause of the constitutional violation). Both of these newer terms derive from Harris and Tuttle.
See supra notes 120-34 and accompanying text. Note, however, that Harris did not require a
culpability requirement and only centered on deliberate indifference as a single standard for
failure to train cases. See supra note 134.
1999]
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act, 167 Brown had to satisfy "rigorous standards of culpability and cau-
sation" to avoid holding the county vicariously liable. 168
The Court distinguished previous cases to indicate the problematic
nature of Brown's claim. While Owen and Fact Concerts recognized a
cause of action based on a municipality's single decision, these cases
also involved situations where the municipal action itself established
the fault and causation elements by violating federal law. 169 In addi-
tion, the decision by the county prosecutor in Pembaur did not present
questions of fault and causation, as the policy directly caused the
plaintiff's injuries.' 70 Thus, these decisions did not alleviate Brown's
burden. 171
The Court relied on Harris to assert that a claim against a munici-
pality's lawful action must show that the policymaker acted with delib-
erate indifference to "known or obvious consequences. 1 72 Harris,
however, involved the analysis of a training program in connection
with the plaintiff's lack of necessary medical attention.173 As a result,
the plaintiff in that case had a stronger basis to prove fault and causa-
tion compared to Brown's claim, as an inadequate program produces
continual harms to the public and notifies policymakers of their need
to act.174 Brown rested her argument about Bryan County's inade-
quate hiring decision on a theory that the decision constituted a devia-
tion from Moore's ordinary practices, as he allegedly screened all
other applicants adequately.1 75 In response to this theory, the Court
raised concern that the county will be held liable without fault.176
Moreover, the Court held that federalism concerns arise from creating
federal requirements for a municipality's hiring decisions. 177
Brown also argued that Burns's use of excessive force could be
plainly obvious to Moore when hiring Burns, thus establishing the re-
quired culpability and causation elements. 178 The Court denied
167. Moore's decision to hire Burns in spite of his background did not violate state law, as
Oklahoma statutes only prohibited hiring officers with a conviction of a felony. Brief for Peti-
tioner at 13, Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (No. 95-1100).
168. Brown, 520 U.S. at 405.
169. Id.; see supra notes 66-83, 88-99 and accompanying text.
170. Brown, 520 U.S. at 405-06; see supra notes 100-14 and accompanying text.
171. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 405-06.
172. Id. at 407.
173. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
174. Brown, 520 U.S. at 407.
175. Id. at 408.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 415.
178. Id. at 1391. Brown argued that since Moore had notice of Burns's tendency to commit
violent crimes, the jury could easily conclude that Moore remained deliberately indifferent to
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Brown's analogy to the rationale in Harris, as predicting the conse-
quence of a single hiring decision would be much more difficult than
predicting the consequence of inadequate training.179 Furthermore, a
full screening of an applicant may not exhibit any cause for concern,
and thus one who fails to screen does not consciously disregard danger
to the public merely by not acting. 180 As a result, only where ade-
quate screening would "lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude
that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the appli-
cant would be the deprivation of a third party's federally protected
right can the official's failure to adequately scrutinize the applicant's
background constitute 'deliberate indifference."" 1
The district court instructed the jury to determine if Moore's inade-
quate screening of Burns's background was "so likely to result in vio-
lations of constitutional rights" that Moore remained deliberately
indifferent to Brown's constitutional rights.182 Because this instruc-
tion failed to require that Burns's excessive force would be a "plainly
obvious consequence" of Moore's screening, the proper causal con-
nection did not exist. 183 Furthermore, Brown failed to provide suffi-
cient evidence that Moore disregarded a known or obvious risk of
injury. 184 The Court focused on the nature of Burns's past offenses,
finding that the assault and battery arose from a fight on a college
campus where he was a student. 185 Despite the fact that these inci-
dents may indicate Burns's status as an "extremely poor candidate for
reserve deputy,"'1 86 the record did not establish that excessive force
would be a plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision. 187
2. The Dissents' Critique188
Justice Souter's dissent focused on the majority's application of the
rule in Pembaur, where a policymaker's single act could constitute de-
potential victims of Burns's tendencies. See Brief for Respondent at 29-30, Brown, 520 U.S. 397
(No. 95-1100).
179. Brown, 520 U.S. at 409-10.
180. Id. at 411.
181. Id.
182. Brown v. Board of County Comm'rs, 67 F.3d 1174, 1185 n.21 (5th Cir. 1995).
183. Brown, 520 U.S. at 412.
184. Id. at 412-13.
185. Id. at 413. Petitioner's attorney asserted that Burns engaged in a "shoving match" with a
fraternity group, and this incident led to his plea of guilty to assault and battery. Brief for Peti-
tioner at 21, Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (No. 95-1100). At this time Burns also entered plea agree-
ments on his traffic offenses, false identification charge, and driving while intoxicated charge. Id.
186. Brown, 520 U.S. at 414.
187. Id. at 515.
188. Four justices dissented from the majority opinion: Justices Souter, Stevens, Breyer, and
Ginsburg. Id. at 416, 430.
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liberate indifference to a "substantial risk" that a violation of federal
law will result. 189 In defining the deliberate indifference standard,
Souter found that this standard equates to finding a level of intent
behind the municipality's policy.190 Given that the Court had never
rejected holding a municipality liable for a policy that in itself does not
violate federal law, Sheriff Moore's decision could constitute a policy
that satisfies this standard.' 91
While the majority agreed with the above theoretical analysis, Sou-
ter found that the practical interpretation in the present case "ex-
presse[d] deep skepticism" that a municipality could ever be liable for
a facially constitutional act resulting in a violation of another's
rights.192 When interpreting the deliberate indifference standard, the
majority applied dicta in Harris to set the high threshold of "plainly
obvious" consequences.' 93 This language referred to a speculation
that officers' frequent violations of constitutional rights would indicate
to policymakers that further training clearly was necessary to prevent
harm to the public. 194 Furthermore, Harris did not require liability
based on deliberate indifference toward the constitutional violation
itself, but only to the need for further action. 95 Hence, Souter found
that the majority's skepticism influenced the legal analysis determin-
ing the outcome of the case.
Justice Souter also criticized the majority's fear that respondeat su-
perior liability will transpire, which contributes to the requirement of
the plainly obvious standard. 96 In contrast to this fear, the deliberate
indifference standard ensures that the municipality remains liable for
only faulty actions.' 97 Moreover, the Court's requirement of a strict
causal connection between the municipal action and the violation can
receive full scrutiny under a theory of proximate cause.1 98 Once
again, the majority's skepticism, driven by the fear of vicarious liabil-
ity, 199 created more difficult legal requirements.
Finally, Justice Souter examined the record and determined that the
evidence supported the jury verdict, even under the plainly obvious
189. Id. at 416. Justices Stevens and Breyer joined Souter's dissent. Id.
190. Id. at 419.
191. Id. at 420.
192. Brown, 520 U.S. at 421.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 422 (referring to City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989)).
195. Id. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text for support of this contention.
196. Brown, 520 U.S. at 425.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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standard.200 Since Sheriff Moore knew that Burns possessed a long
criminal record and failed to investigate further, the jury could find
that Moore remained deliberately indifferent by acting to aid a rela-
tive rather than properly investigate. 20' Brown's expert witness also
testified that Burns' criminal record showed a "'blatant disregard for
the law and problems that may show themselves in abusing the public
or using excessive force." 20 2 As a result, the jury could find that ex-
cessive force was a plainly obvious consequence of the hiring
decision. 20 3
Justice Breyer's dissent critiqued the complexity of modern § 1983
analysis.204 The rejection of respondeat superior liability found in the
majority's view derived from the dictum in Monell that examined the
history of Congress's refusal to accept the Sherman Amendment.20 5
This examination ignored the history of judicial action that held mu-
nicipalities vicariously liable.20 6 The use of the word "person" in
§ 1983 also supported a theory of respondeat superior because federal
courts applied this analysis with other statutes.20 7
Notwithstanding the Court's troubled historical analysis, Breyer de-
nounced the majority's use of complex distinctions. 20 8 For example, a
finding of deliberate indifference will hold the municipality liable, in
contrast to the lesser standard of gross negligence. 20 9 These distinc-
tions act as another method of avoiding the use of respondeat superior
and do not aid a sound legal analysis.210 Given that many states pres-
ently apply respondeat superior by allowing cases against the munici-
pality for officials' actions within the scope of their employment,211
200. Id.
201. Id. at 426-27.
202. Brown, 520 U.S. at 429 (quoting the record).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 430. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined Breyer's dissent. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 431 (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 836 n.8 (1985) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)). See supra note 58 for further support of this assertion.
207. Brown, 520 U.S. at 432. See supra note 52 for support of this contention from Monell.
208. Brown, 520 U.S. at 434.
209. Id. at 435; see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 n.7 (1989) (finding that courts
more often require deliberate indifference rather than gross negligence).
210. Brown, 520 U.S at 435.
211. Id. at 436 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-465 (1997); IDAHO CODE § 6-903 (1990); ILL.
COMP. STAT. 10/2-302 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6109 (1989); MINN. STAT. § 466.07
(1994); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-305 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.0349 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 29-A:2 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-04(4) (Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 162
(Supp. 1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8548 (1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-19-1 (Michie 1994);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-36 (1993); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-11 (1992); Wis. STAT. § 895.46
(1993-94)).
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Breyer found the Court's use of these legal complexities unwar-
ranted.212
II. ANALYSIS
Given the overview of the Court's interpretation of § 1983 claims
against municipalities in Part I, one can see that Supreme Court pre-
cedent does not create a firm rule for situations where a failure to act
causes the plaintiff's injury. While a standard of deliberate indiffer-
ence dictates the analysis,213 the Court's application of this standard
prior to Brown appeared to allow some claims when an inadequate
program represents city policy.214 Brown, however, presented the is-
sue of a municipality's hiring decision causing the plaintiff's injury,
which required the Court to focus closely on the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard.
As noted by the dissents in Brown,21 5 the Court limited municipal
liability to an area much more confined than previous cases allowed.
When extending the majority's use of the deliberate indifference stan-
dard to Brown's position, one discovers the near impossibility of
presenting a valid § 1983 claim against the county.216 This impossibil-
ity, as shown in Part II.A, derives from the Court's divergence from
constitutional law theory. As shown in Part II.B, this legal complexity
presents specific problems for police abuse victims and truly avoids
the purposes of the statute. Despite the Court's justifications for this
trend, fairness and justice require a more effective remedy for police
abuse, and a respondeat superior theory would provide this
remedy. 217
A. The Court's Strong Barrier: Deliberate Indifference
Justice Souter accused the majority in Brown of increasing require-
ments of deliberate indifference by raising the "plainly obvious" dic-
tum in Harris to a new standard.218 The majority, in a footnote of the
decision, argued that Brown failed to show Moore's deliberate indif-
ference to her constitutional right, and therefore the "plainly obvious"
language did not increase the standard.219 In addition to this failed
212. Id.
213. See supra Parts I.D.2 to I.D.3.
214. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986).
215. See supra Part I.E.2.
216. See infra Part II.A.
217. See infra Part II.C.
218. Brown, 520 U.S. at 422.
219. Id. at 413 n.1.
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showing, the majority demonstrated the lower courts' gap of reason-
ing in finding deliberate indifference and the policy behind this
standard:
The difficulty with the lower courts' approach is that it fails to con-
nect the background of [Burns] to the particular constitutional vio-
lation [Brown] suffered. Ensuring that lower courts link the
background of the officer to the constitutional violation alleged
does not complicate our municipal liability jurisprudence with de-
grees of "obviousness," but seeks to ensure that a plaintiff in an
inadequate screening case establishes a policymaker's deliberate in-
difference-that is, conscious disregard for the known and obvious
consequences of his actions. 220
The above argument ignores that the Court applied the deliberate
indifference standard in Brown with a heightened requirement that
Burns's background indicated with plain obviousness that a violation
will occur.221 In examining Burns's record, the Court perceived the
various charges as arising from a college fight and other minor inci-
dents of misdemeanors. 222 As a result, Sheriff Moore would not nec-
essarily infer that Burns would harm the public. Brown, on the other
hand, established a much different picture of Burns's background and
argued that the offenses showed a "disregard for the law and a pro-
pensity for violence. ' 223 She presented an expert witness who testi-
fied that Burns remained unfit to be a police officer based on a blatant
disregard for the law.224 Given this display of unlawfulness, the jury
could have perceived Moore's conscious decision to hire a relative
with propensities for violence, and thus found that the policymaker
220. Id. (citation omitted). In contrast to this strict objective test for deliberate indifference,
the Court accepted a more subjective test in cases involving prison officials who violate a victim's
Eighth Amendment rights: the official must know that a "substantial risk of serious harm" exists
and disregard this risk by "failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). The Fifth Circuit recently noted Brown in a prison staffing case for
holding that a plaintiff must produce evidence that the city knew or should have known of em-
ployees' likelihood of repeatedly raping the plaintiff when the city maintained the same staffing
level at the jail for a long period of time. Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 55 n.4 (5th Cir. 1997).
221. Brown, 520 U.S. at 414.
[U]nless [Moore] would necessarily have reached [the decision that Burns would be a
poor deputy] because Burns' use of excessive force would have been a plainly obvious
consequence of the hiring decision, Sheriff Moore's inadequate scrutiny of Burns' rec-
ord cannot constitute "deliberate indifference" to [Brown's] federally protected right to
be free from a use of excessive force.
Id.
222. Id. at 413-14.
223. Brown v. Board of County Comm'rs, 67 F.3d 1174, 1183 (5th Cir. 1995).
224. Brief for Respondent at 3, Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (No. 95-1100). Dr. Otto Schweizer, a
professor of criminal justice, worked for over twenty years in law enforcement. Id. at 2-3. Bryan
County's expert witness also agreed that knowledge of Burns' criminal history should lead to a
further review of his qualifications. Brown, 67 F.3d at 1184.
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consciously disregarded the high likelihood that harm would occur to
the public. 225
With such a strong background of criminal activity and unfitness for
police activity, the jury seemed completely justified in finding Burns
deliberately indifferent "to the rights of persons with whom the police
come into contact. '226 The majority's focus on the obvious conse-
quences of this background, and in particular the constitutional viola-
tion occurring to Brown, obfuscates a clear legal analysis. While
Pembaur allowed liability based on a single decision by a municipal
policymaker,227 the majority argued that Pembaur did not present is-
sues of fault and causation.2 28 These issues only arise in this case,
though, from the Court's resistance 229 against allowing claims against
municipalities. 230
In the specific context of an inadequate hiring decision, the Court
appears to tacitly require that a plaintiff show other instances of faulty
hiring practices to hold the municipality liable. Brown attempted to
analogize her situation to a hypothetical example in Harris that al-
lowed liability based on a single instance of failing to train an of-
ficer. 231 Just as a court would hold a decisionmaker liable for failing
to train an officer in the constitutional limitations of using deadly
force,232 a court could hold the county liable for hiring an applicant
when the decisionmaker possessed notice of a tendency to commit vi-
olent crimes. 233 The Court rejected this analogy, however, for failing
to provide a proper mechanism to predict the consequence of the hir-
ing decision.234 By contrast, the Court held that a failure to train of-
ficers to handle recurring situations may, "in a narrow range of
circumstances," present a high level of predictability that a violation
225. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 429 (Souter, J., dissenting).
226. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
227. See supra Part I.D.2.
228. Brown, 520 U.S. at 406.
229. Justice Souter labels this resistance "skepticism." Id. at 416; see supra notes 192-99 and
accompanying text.
230. The Court's resistance follows similar reasoning in Harris, 489 U.S. at 391-92 ("To adopt
lesser standards of fault and causation would open municipalities to unprecedented liability
under § 1983.").
231. Id. at 390 n.10.
232. Id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)).
233. See Brief for Respondent at 29 n.17, Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (No. 95-1100). One may find a
basis for the Court's application of deliberate indifference to this case in respondent's argument
that causation problems do not arise in situations such as Brown's: "proximate cause will exist
only in those rare cases ... where the municipality has pre-employment notice of some specific
tendency to commit a particular deprivation, and it is that particular deprivation that occurs."
Id.
234. Brown, 520 U.S. at 409.
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of federal rights will occur.235 While the Court left open the issue of
whether a single inadequate screening could constitute deliberate in-
difference in any situation,2 36 the resistance to Brown's analogy does
not provide much of a basis for ever holding a municipality liable in
such a situation.237
Prior to Brown, some could interpret the deliberate indifference
standard as restating a form of recklessness. 238 In fact, Harris indi-
cated that this standard does not turn upon the degree of fault that a
plaintiff would need to show.239 Brown, however, sets a high eviden-
tiary standard that appears higher than criminal recklessness. 240 Since
the Court simply determined that Burns's record remained insufficient
to establish Moore's deliberate indifference, 241 a plaintiff would need
to present further evidence that Moore fully disregarded the substan-
tial risk that Burns would use excessive force. Given the Court's rea-
soning, a plaintiff would need to either show that the applicant
committed felonies242 or present evidence that the applicant had a his-
235. Id. at 409-10. This level of predictability may also contribute to establishing an "infer-
ence of causation." Id. at 410.
236. Id. at 412.
237. 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF
SECTION 1983 § 6:30, at 6-72 (4th ed. 1997) ("[Brown] applied the deliberate indifference stan-
dard to a single hiring decision, but did so with such rigor ... that it will be difficult if not
impossible for § 1983 plaintiffs to prevail in such cases in the future.").
238. See Brief for Respondent at 30 n.18, Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (No. 95-1100).
239. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 n.8 (1989); see supra note 134. But see Bar-
bara Kritchevsky, Making Sense of State of Mind: Determining Responsibility in Section 1983
Municipality Liability Litigation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 416, 437 (1992) (discovering that Har-
ris creates a fault-based approach following Justice O'Connor's dissent in City of Springfield v.
Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 260-72 (1987)).
240. Brown, 520 U.S. at 421 (Souter, J., dissenting). For a definition of criminal recklessness,
see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985):
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he con-
sciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists
or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that,
considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known
to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-
abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
Id.; see JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 115 (2d ed. 1960)
("[Riecklessness differs from intention in that the actor does not seek to attain the harm; he has
not chosen it, has not decided or resolved that it shall occur. Instead, he believes that the harm
will not occur or, in an aggravated form of recklessness, he is indifferent whether it does or does
not occur."); ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 850 (3d ed. 1982) ("As-
suming [conduct that grossly failed to meet the reasonable person standard of care], if the actor
was aware of the risk he was creating, and consciously disregarded that risk, however much he
may have hoped that no harm would result, he was acting recklessly.").
241. Brown, 520 U.S. at 411-15.
242. This method would show that Moore violated the Oklahoma statute prohibiting the hir-
ing of such persons. See Brief for Petitioner at 13, Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (No. 95-1100).
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tory of continually applying excessive force. Because a record of mis-
demeanors did not adequately establish the second method, a plaintiff
faces a strong barrier to holding the entity liable.
In fact, Brown has already influenced many courts throughout the
circuits to require a strict analysis into the municipality's activity when
confronting a § 1983 claim. Contrary to what some may suppose, the
courts do not limit their reliance on this case to inadequate screening
situations. In fact, they conform to the Court's strict requirements for
culpability and causation in a variety of situations.243 Courts require
plaintiffs who present a failure to train theory to show other incidents
of the inadequate policy. 244 In addition, they extend Brown to claims
243. This approach conforms to the Court's constant extensions of dicta in specific circum-
stances to apply in broader situations. See, e.g., supra notes 222-28 and accompanying text.
244. In Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1998), the Fifth Circuit reversed a jury
verdict holding the city liable for an inadequate stress management program. Id. at 799. Even
though the plaintiff presented evidence that the offending officer acted under considerable
stress, the court asserted that he needed to present evidence of overstressed officers throughout
the city. Id. at 798.
In Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997), the First Circuit rejected a female arrestee's
claim that the town failed to train officers who strip-searched her for drugs while not strip-
searching her boyfriend. Id. at 11. By relying on Brown, the court found that the town did not
have notice of inadequate training, since the plaintiff failed to allege any other incidents of im-
proper strip searches, and therefore could not be held liable. Id. The lieutenant and officer
could be held liable, however, if evidence shows that they did not act reasonably in conducting
the search. Id. at 10.
Similarly, a California district court held that a plaintiff could not establish a failure to train
claim under § 1983 for injuries resulting from an officer pushing him away from a police dog
when the plaintiff was drunk. Palacios v. City of Oakland, 970 F. Supp. 732, 744 (N.D. Cal.
1997). Based on Harris and Brown, the court did not accept the plaintiff's argument that an
improved training program would have prevented the injury, as he would need to show that the
program itself fails constitutional standards. Id.
The Seventh Circuit, in Robles v. City of Fort Wayne, 113 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 1997), relied on
Brown to assert that the plaintiff must establish a pattern of violations, or the entity's awareness
of such a pattern, to have a § 1983 action under a failure to train theory in this particular case.
Id. at 735-36. The defendant officer worked off-duty as a security guard for a tavern and used
excessive force on the plaintiff, and the plaintiff alleged that the city failed to train off-duty
officers and thus remained deliberately indifferent. Id. at 736. The Court rejected the plaintiff's
claim, as no pattern of violations by off-duty officers existed to create deliberate indifference. Id.
See, however, Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837 (10th Cir. 1997), which allowed a § 1983 action
under an inadequate training theory. Id. at 845. Officers, after hearing that Allen threatened to
kill himself and possessed a gun while sitting in his vehicle, reached into the vehicle and at-
tempted to seize Allen's gun. Id. at 839. As a result, Allen pointed his gun toward the officers,
who reacted by firing twelve rounds of ammunition into his vehicle, resulting in Allen's death.
Id. The plaintiff, as a representative of Allen, alleged that the city failed to adequately train the
officers on how to deal with mentally ill persons with ammunition. Id. at 842. The court applied
a four-part test according to law within the circuit:
[A] plaintiff must show (1) the officers exceeded constitutional limitations on the use of
force; (2) the use of force arose under circumstances that constitute a usual and recur-
ring situation with which police officers must deal; (3) the inadequate training demon-
strates a deliberate indifference on the part of the city toward persons with whom the
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based on a failure to supervise theory.245 Brown has also directed
courts to carefully scrutinize the causation between the municipal pol-
icy and the victim's injury.2 46
The Court's apparent regression toward municipal immunity seems
to derive from both a strong emphasis on federalism and a fusion of
tort concepts into constitutional law. Ever since Praprotnik, a constit-
uency of the Court altered the scope of § 1983 to uphold ideals of
federalism and to have federal courts intervene only when local law
demonstrates that the policymaker authorized a lower-level official to
act in a way that infringes the victim's federal rights. 247 Brown encap-
police officers come into contact, and (4) there is a direct causal link between the con-
stitutional deprivation and the inadequate training.
Id. at 841-42. With regard to the third requirement, the plaintiff presented an expert witness
who testified that the officers acted inappropriately in the situation according to standard police
procedures when approaching a suicidal armed person. Id. at 842. The Court accepted the
plaintiff's claim and distinguished the situation from Brown by arguing the facts present the
"narrow range of circumstances" that allow an inadequate training theory based on a single
incident. Id. at 845.
245. A New York district court found that the city could not be held liable for failing to train
and supervise an officer who shot the plaintiff when evidence failed to demonstrate how the lack
of supervision caused the officer to shoot the plaintiff. Morissey v. City of New York, 963 F.
Supp. 270, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The court held that the city was not required to train "coopera-
tors," officers attempting to catch other officers in illegal activity, that they will encounter stress
and that this stress should not be released through shooting others. Id. Since the city had some
monitoring of the officers in place, the plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence of a failure to
supervise. Id. A West Virginia district court, likewise, held that a plaintiff could not maintain a
§ 1983 action under failure to train, supervise, and discipline when officers searched her apart-
ment mistakenly for drugs. Robertson v. City of Beckley, 963 F. Supp. 570, 576 (S.D. W. Va.
1997). The court asserted that Brown "emphasizes the difficult proof burden [the plaintiff]
would have to meet in order to establish municipal liability." Id. at 576 n.5.
246. In Snyder, the Fifth Circuit relied on Brown to hold that the plaintiff's evidence on the
offending officer's stress "did not establish even a remote link between the city's failure to enact
a stress management program and Snyder's injury." Snyder, 142 F.3d at 799. The Seventh Cir-
cuit, in West v. Waymire, 114 F.3d 646 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 337 (1997), found that a
town could not be held liable under § 1983 for an officer's sexual abuse of the plaintiff, a thir-
teen-year-old girl, as an obvious risk did not exist that the officer was a child molester. Id. at
652. Since the town only knew that he made comments to the girl's mother that "no 13 year old
looks that good in a pair of jeans," the court believed the town did not possess knowledge that
the officer would sexually abuse the girl. Id. at 648, 652. A Pennsylvania district court similarly
dismissed a complaint that alleged that a school had a policy of allowing a teacher to insult
students based on their heritage. Nicole K. v. Upper Perkiomen Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 931, 937
(E.D. Pa. 1997). The teacher repeatedly called the plaintiff, a seventh grade girl, a "Neo-Nazi"
and "the German girl." Id. Relying on Brown's "moving force" requirement, the court found
that the school could not be held liable under § 1983. Id.
See, however, Haberthur v. City of Raymore, 119 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 1997), which allowed
action against an officer and the city for the officer's sexual abuse while on duty. Id. at 723-24.
247. See Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 27, at 791-93 (demonstrating that the current require-
ment of a "policy" reflects Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Monroe, allowing municipal liability
only when the state authorizes the unconstitutional conduct, and moves beyond this view by
limiting liability to cases in which the highest authority in the situation authorizes the conduct);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 211-37 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's
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sulated this concern for states' rights: "A failure to apply stringent
culpability and causation requirements raises serious federalism con-
cerns, in that it risks constitutionalizing particular hiring requirements
that States have themselves elected not to impose. '248 While a legiti-
mate concern, one commentator criticized similar justifications based
on the cost of § 1983 suits in 1980 by asserting that the Constitution
and the statute "embody a choice to bear certain costs to vindicate
fundamental rights." 249
Coinciding with federalism concerns, the Court applied more com-
plex tort principles to limit § 1983 actions against municipalities.250
Rather than fully examine the issue of municipal responsibility for
constitutional violations,2 51 the Court constructs legal fictions
grounded in tort law that avoid pragmatic problems of compensating
victims and deterring future abuses.2 52 The concept of deliberate in-
difference exemplifies this process, as the Court concentrates on the
policymaker's state of mind to determine the municipality's responsi-
bility.253 As a result, § 1983 plaintiffs suffer an arduous task of over-
coming many legal hurdles, effectively creating municipal immunity.
B. Fostering Legal Difficulties for Police Abuse Victims
Consistent with Justice Brennan's dicta in Monell,254 Brown and its
precursors promote the theory of ensuring fault before imposing lia-
plurality opinion in Praprotnik firmly recognized Justice Brennan's dictum in Pembaur establish-
ing the final policymaking requirement as a fundamental threshold for municipal liability. Lewis
& Blumoff, supra note 27, at 791-93. O'Connor's view obtained a majority in Jett v. Dallas
Independent School District, which allocated the responsibility of identifying the policymaking
officials to the judge before the case can proceed to the jury. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491
U.S. 701, 737 (1989). The author thanks Professor Clifford Zimmerman for providing this analy-
sis of the Court's reasoning.
248. Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997).
249. Christina B. Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 40 (1980).
250. See Nahmod, supra note 36, at 1746 (arguing that the use of tort rhetoric "encourages"
the development toward state power).
251. See Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH.
L. REV. 225, 236 (1986) ("[V]irtually no attention was given in Monell to the definition of what
were indeed the municipality's 'own violations."'). Whitman argues that the Court's focus on a
"state of mind" for determining entity liability assumes that government entities have minds to
evaluate. Id. at 248-49.
252. See Barbara Kritchevsky, "Or Causes to be Subjected": The Role of Causation in Section
1983 Municipal Liability Analysis, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1187 (1988) (arguing that tort principles of
causation lead away from Monell's focus on responsibility); Mead, supra note 58, at 545 (finding
that the use of fault goes against the bsic requirement in § 1983 of a constitutional violation
under the color of state law); see also supra note 36.
253. See Kritchevsky, supra note 239 (interpreting the Court's focus on state of mind as deter-
minative of when the municipal action violates the Constitution).
254. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978); see supra Part I.B.2.
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bility on a municipality.2 55 This reasoning leads to an extremely high
threshold for a victim of police abuse.2 56 Over the past nineteen
years, the Court has formed a legal theory that in effect immunizes
municipalities without expressly advocating this doctrine.2 57 By creat-
ing this legal shield for municipalities, the Court has ignored historic
and modern purposes of § 1983.258 As discussed below, the Court's
modern jurisprudence frustrates the remedial nature of the statute
and precludes possibilities of compensation.
When presenting a § 1983 action, a plaintiff faces numerous
problems with obtaining compensation against individual officers: the
plaintiff may not be able to obtain an attorney to take the case;2 5 9 the
plaintiff may be unable to identify the offending officer;260 juries tend
to credit the officer's testimony over the victim's;2 61 officers conform
to a "code of silence," even when on the stand;262 the jury may not be
willing to place a burden on the officer;2 63 the city's resources vastly
outweigh the plaintiff's; 264 the city will not conform to discovery re-
quirements until ordered by a court to do So;265 and the officer may
not be able to pay substantial damages if found liable.266 Given these
difficulties, providing a victim with the outlet of charging the munici-
255. See supra Part I.
256. One should not underestimate the great difficulty a plaintiff faces in any § 1983 action for
police abuse. See infra notes 258-66 and accompanying text.
257. See Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 27, at 801-06 (arguing that the Court alters the scope of
§ 1983 itself by requiring plaintiffs to pass various legal tests before ever reaching the jury).
258. For a discussion of the need to liberate § 1983 from historical restraints, see supra note
34.
259. Patton, supra note 5, at 755 (finding that the victim of excessive force has difficulty ob-
taining an attorney unless she has credible witnesses, tangible evidence, or suffered severe bru-
tality). The attorney also faces large financial risks when filing a § 1983 suit. Id. at 756-57.
260. Hellige, supra note 58, at 918.
261. Colbert, supra note 24, at 548 (observing that juries perceive officers' jobs as difficult and
dangerous); see Freeman, supra note 8, at 724 (arguing that the same traits that make the victim
vulnerable to police beatings also create a lack of credibility with juries); Joyner, supra note 5, at
114 (finding that citizens more often believe the circumstances require the officer's actions);
Edward J. Littlejohn, Civil Liability and the Police Officer: The Need for New Deterrents to Police
Misconduct, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 365, 426 (1981) (discovering clear pro-police bias in Detroit);
Patton, supra note 5, at 756 (arguing that the victim's traits do not cause the jury to sympathize).
262. Patton, supra note 5, at 763-64; see Darlene Ricker, Behind the Silence, A.B.A. J., July
1991, 45, 46 (reporting that officers will often commit perjury rather than break the code of
silence). The problem of perjury remains substantial given that the Court allows immunity for
officers who testify at criminal trials and thus does not allow an action under § 1983 to challenge
officers' testimonies. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326 (1983).
263. Steichen, supra note 27, at 1052.
264. Patton, supra note 5, at 760 (finding that the city will sometimes retain outside counsel in
addition to city attorneys for a more powerful defense).
265. Id. at 761.
266. Hellige, supra note 58, at 918.
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pality itself with fault would coincide with notions of fairness.2 67 If the
victim did not possess this outlet, the purpose of providing a federal
remedy would be lost.
In the modern days of oversized dockets in the federal courts, one
may wonder why a victim of police abuse needs the availability of
federal supervision. One response to this question derives from the
nature of § 1983 itself. Because the statute provides a supplementary
federal remedy for constitutional violations,268 a victim should be able
to present a proper claim in the federal system.2 69 Furthermore, deci-
sions from federal courts provide a symbolic assertion that certain
rights will receive protection above existing state remedies, or lack
thereof.270 When a victim chooses to present a case in federal court,
he or she may desire a federal judge's expertise and freedom from
state political ties,271 a more impartial jury,272 or the advantages of
federal procedures. 273 Besides providing compensation to victims, the
267. Id. at 919. The NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, in its amicus brief, asserted
another justification of fairness for holding the municipality responsible: "When a municipality
hires a police officer it implicitly asks the public to trust that officer's decisionmaking abilities
and authority. Citizens, in turn, trust the municipality to use sound selection practices in hiring
the individuals who will obtain extraordinary power over citizens' lives." Amicus Brief of NOW
Legal Defense and Education Fund at 12-13, Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 502 U.S. 397
(1997) (No. 95-1100). In other words, the empowerment by the public creates an obligation to
ensure endangerment to their safety will not transpire from inappropriate municipal practices.
This obligation would receive ultimate protection by holding the municipality responsible for its
actions that lead to others' injuries. See infra Part II.C.
268. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
269. See Whitman, supra note 249, at 28 ("Where rights have been determined to be of consti-
tutional merit, caseload considerations are necessarily secondary to the vindication of those
rights."). For a discussion of how the legislative history of statute supports this analysis, see
supra Part I.A.
270. Whitman, supra note 249, at 24. The issue of solving local problems through the federal
system strikes at the heart of the debate between federalism and a uniform legal system. In the
end, pragmatic solutions must prevail over traditional allocations of legal responsibility:
Contraction of government liability reduces government accountability. It encourages
the government to delegate without supervising, because its employees' acts may then
be seen as "random and unauthorized" and thus not the government's concern. ...
[T]he state is left to clean its own house. The result is that the Constitution imposes no
barrier between the citizen and coercive state power.
Susan Bandes, Monell, Parratt, Daniels, and Davidson: Distinguishing a Custom or Policy from a
Random, Unauthorized Act, 72 IOWA L. REV. 101, 127 (1986).
271. Bandes, supra note 270, at 124-25.
272. Despite this familiar justification, federal district court juries have become more repre-
sentative of suburban, white, middle-class males. See Patton, supra note 5, at 766.
273. Some examples of advantages a plaintiff may possess in federal court include: notice
pleading, 1 STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS § 8.2(a) (photo
reprint 1997) (1988); Rule 11 sanctions, id.; more favorable discovery policies, id. § 8.2(d); entry
of felony convictions into evidence, id. § 8.6; and a greater chance of creating a class action, id.
§ 8.8. Cf. id. § 8.2(c)-(d) (stating that many states allow plaintiffs to allege "Doe defendants"
and that state court judges may be more reluctant to grant summary judgment motions).
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suit brings political attention to the issue of police brutality, educates
the public on police practices, and may deter police misconduct. 274 As
a result, a federal remedy should remain available to the victim.
The ability to bring these civil claims receives more support when
one considers the specific situation in Brown. The deputy and sheriff
testified that they engaged in a high-speed chase for four miles after
the Browns turned away from the checkpoint.2 75 This high speed sce-
nario, resulting in serious injuries to the victim, commonly occurs and
often results in shootings. 276 Furthermore, Mr. Brown testified that
he had problems with the checkpoints in the past and therefore
avoided the scene. 277 Mr. Brown is not alone in experiencing re-
peated abuses by the same officers, as the officers who get charged
with brutality often committed the same acts in the past. 278 With
these systematic problems, the § 1983 action, if allowed to proceed
274. Patton, supra note 5, at 800-01 (finding that if the suit receives large media attention or
obtains a large financial award, deterrence will result); Alice McQuillan, City Cop Brutality
Claims Up 24%, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 10, 1998, at 4 ("Brutality complaints against police
soared 24% during the first quarter of 1998, apparently because the high-profile Abner Louima
cop torture case has prompted more accusers to come forward."); see Hoffman, supra note 5, at
1518 (arguing that § 1983 claims, if allowed to proceed effectively, will inspire better training and
supervision of officers). Of course, social remedies may provide for a more direct way of re-
forming police abuse and giving citizens more control over their officers. See HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 5, at 85 ("Civil remedies must always be available, but they cannot be a
substitute for police department mechanisms of accountability or prosecutorial action."); Col-
bert, supra note 24, at 500 n.2 (arguing that the public's trust in police could receive reinforce-
ment from more powerful civilian review boards).
275. Brown v. Board of County Comm'rs, 67 F.3d 1174, 1177-78 (5th Cir. 1995).
276. Freeman, supra note 8, at 758 (describing this scenario as the "post-pursuit syndrome");
Hoffman, supra note 5, at 1473 (finding shootings as the most common form of abuse in pursuit
cases).
Just recently, the Court clarified the standard for a substantive due process claim against an
individual officer during a high-speed automobile chase. In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118
S. Ct. 1708 (1998), the Court found that an officer did not violate substantive due process in such
a situation, as the "shocks-the-conscience" test could not be met. Id. at 1711. Philip Lewis was a
passenger on a motorcycle that Officer Smith chased and ran into at 40 miles an hour, resulting
in Lewis's death. Id. at 1712. The Court defended Officer Smith's actions:
While prudence would have repressed the reaction, the officer's instinct was to do his
job as a law enforcement officer, not to induce [the driver's] lawlessness, or to terrorize,
cause harm, or kill. Prudence, that is, was subject to countervailing enforcement con-
siderations, and while Smith exaggerated their demands, there is no reason to believe
that they were tainted by an improper or malicious motive on his part.
Id. at 1721. The Court's attitude on the side of law enforcement shows how much difficulty a
plaintiff faces in challenging an officer's actions, especially in high-speed chase situations.
277. See supra note 151.
278. Patton, supra note 5, at 768 (citing Flint Taylor, Proof on Police Failure to Discipline
Cases: A Survey (pt. 2), 3 POLICE MISCONDUCT & Civ. RTS. L. REP. 39, 42-43, 45, 47 (1990)).
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productively, 79 would address these problems by holding municipali-
ties accountable for the injuries society suffers.
Brown and the deliberate indifference standard frustrates the ability
of a victim of police abuse to present such an action. By focusing on
federalism and complex tort hurdles, 280 the Court ignores the practical
need for systematic changes in police departments. The structure of
police departments follows a "bottom-up" scheme that provides
lower-level officials with a large amount of autonomy and discretion
to handle stressful situations.281 In a sense, the officers themselves
establish the "policies" for a department when choosing to act in cer-
tain ways with the public.282 Just as individual members of the Ku
Klux Klan invaded local institutions and created social injustice
through surreptitious means,2 83 abusive officers thrive in departments
that may not authorize or prohibit their actions.284 Because the Court
limits municipal liability to situations where high-level individuals
know or clearly should know about specific harms likely to occur, vic-
tims remain unable to effectively alter local departments' lack of
accountability.
Given the continuing trend to heighten standards for § 1983 plain-
tiffs, one can only wonder how they can obtain compensation or how
society will solve the crisis of police abuse.285 This difficulty becomes
even more complex when one realizes that obtaining an injunction to
279. A respondeat superior theory seems to be the most productive method for these suits.
See Part I.C.
280. See supra notes 226-36 and accompanying text. The Court's focus may derive from an
"individualist model" that ignores social structures. Rosa Eckstein, Comment, Towards a Corn-
munitarian Theory of Responsibility: Bearing the Burden for the Unintended, 45 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 843, 855 (1991) (analyzing the Court's liberalism as protecting the private realm and re-
stricting remedial statutes). Eckstein suggests that a communitarian persective would recognize
the effects of past discrimination and attempt to remedy these effects more directly. Id. at 863.
She desires to balance community and autonomy, however, and thus suggests an alternative to
respondeat superior liability: "the Court could propose a definition of internal institutional re-
sponsibility, basing its imputation of liability against a backdrop of fundamental individual
rights." Id. at 908. Contrary to Eckstein's middle position, one could view respondeat superior
as a more direct route to engaging a community in redressing problems of police misconduct.
281. Schuck, supra note 141, at 1778 ("[Olperating routines, situation-specific social and emo-
tional needs, peer subculture norms and ideologies, and the dynamics and economy of their daily
interactions with the public [determine officers' behavior.]").
282. Id. This observation does not ignore the fact that municipal rules and regulations struc-
ture the way officers deal with the public.
283. See supra note 26.
284. While the author does not necessarily equate abusive police officers to members of the
KKK, one should acknowledge the continual problem of white supremacists employed as law
enforcement officials. See Barnes, supra note 5.
285. See supra note 5.
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stop certain police misconduct remains nearly impossible. 286 Even
though the historical purpose of the statute was to provide a federal
remedy when local abuses of authority occur, the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard frustrates the ability of victims to apply such a remedy.
Consequently, the legal barriers to a § 1983 claim against a municipal-
ity require a simpler and more coherent analysis.
C. Respondeat Superior Liability as a Solution
Contrary to the Court's fear of vicarious liability, respondeat supe-
rior would provide a fair and adequate basis for recovery in police
abuse cases.287 Vicarious liability holds an entity responsible only
when the principal has control over the agent's actions.288 Nineteenth
century common law routinely held municipal corporations vicari-
ously liable.2 89 When one examines the limitations of this doctrine in
light of § 1983 jurisprudence, an adequate solution to the Court's legal
complexities that victims presently face is revealed.
Because the municipality has "clothed the employee with the gov-
ernmental authority necessary for a constitutional abuse to take
place, '2 90 fairness requires holding the municipality responsible.
Without the legitimacy of the municipality, officers' powerful interac-
tions with the public could not occur. This legitimacy also creates the
structure of police departments and the way officers interact with the
public that deliberate indifference fails to address.2 91 As a result, a
victim has the right to obtain compensation from the entity contribut-
ing to a system of abuse by failing to adequately address their officers'
actions.
Given the problems victims face when presenting a claim against
individual officers,292 respondeat superior would provide a fair alter-
286. Patton, supra note 5, at 766 (finding a plaintiff's chances to be "minimal" based on legal
requirements); see, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (requiring a plaintiff to
show that the police will likely apply a certain technique on him or her to have standing).
287. This Comment only addresses respondeat superior in the context of police abuse cases
and does not examine municipal liability for other claims.
288. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) ("A master is subject to liability
for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment."). Con-
duct within the scope of employment generally entails an activity the employer hires the em-
ployee to perform, within the "authorized time and space limits," impelled by a purpose to act
for the employer, and "the use of force is not unexpectable" by the employer. Id. § 228(1).
289. See supra note 58.
290. Rothfeld, supra note 58, at 955; see Steichen, supra note 27, at 1047 (arguing that munici-
palities should absorb the cost of plaintiff's injury when they empower the officers with the
ability to harm others).
291. See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 258-65 and accompanying text.
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native to the victim, deter future violations by "formulating sound mu-
nicipal policy," and create fair treatment of individual officers.293
Furthermore, higher level officials maintain a position that could "bal-
ance liability avoidance measures against the requirements of gov-
erning. ' 294 In the case of Brown, requiring this balance for hiring
decisions would also ensure that the applicant does not have a back-
ground replete with criminal conduct. Respondeat superior would
further spread the cost of constitutional violations across the public.
As a result, the public would receive fuller awareness of corrupt mu-
nicipal officials and respond through democratic processes. 295
This theory of liability would discard both the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard and the requirement of a "policy. ' 296 Consequently,
the new analysis would examine the scope of the officer's duties as a
municipal employee and thus hold the municipality liable for the re-
sulting constitutional violations.297 The Court's requirement of fault
ignores the policy behind § 1983 of preventing governmental abuse.298
Rather than circumvent this policy, courts can limit frivolous suits by
requiring specific allegations of an official's substantial abuse of au-
thority.299 In addition, the plaintiff would still need to prove how the
official caused his or her constitutional injury and the damages he or
she suffered. 300
The Court continues to express the fear that holding municipalities
liable at the federal level would transgress on states' rights to form
293. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 843-44 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
Hoffman, supra note 5, at 1519-20 (arguing that both parties would spend less on lawsuits, consti-
tuting a decrease in costs to society, as well an increased benefit to plaintiffs and a higher
probability that reform to internal policies would occur).
294. Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 27, at 826.
295. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980). One may argue that equita-
ble forms of relief would better accomplish some of the goals of § 1983 by requiring institutions
to act in ways that change systems of corruption. See Whitman, supra note 249, at 49. Imposing
respondeat superior liability on municipalities appears necessary at this point to fully compen-
sate police abuse victims and create an awareness in law enforcement institutions that society
will no longer accept unconstitutional conduct. See Hazel Glenn Beh, Municipal Liability for
Failure to Investigate Citizen Complaints Against Police, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 209, 251-52
(1998) (suggesting that courts' review of citizen complaint procedures benefit the community).
If federal courts reached this step, more improved equitable remedies may not seem so distant a
possibility.
296. See Hoffman, supra note 5, at 1518 (advocating the limit of the issues to whether the
Constitution was infringed and how the victim should be restored).
297. Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 27, at 829-30.
298. Id. at 836.
299. Steichen, supra note 27, at 1049. Cf. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelli-
gence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) (ensuring that civil rights claimants need not
meet a "heightened pleading" standard in alleging Monel claims).
300. Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 27, at 832.
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their own requirements. 301 This concern of federalism does not truly
exist, however, because the Fourteenth Amendment requires limiting
state power when constitutional violations occur.302 Unfortunately, as
Brown and the Louima event demonstrate, serious violations of this
nature continue to occur.303
A legitimate concern with the use of vicarious liability in the con-
text of constitutional torts involves the introduction of more tort con-
cepts into constitutional law.30 4 The use of respondeat superior only
determines the extent of liability of a government entity, not the sub-
stantive issue of how it actually caused the plaintiff's injury.305 One
may argue, therefore, that vicarious liability neglects to formulate a
constitutional theory for imposing responsibility on the government
that the Constitution demands.306 In the context of police abuse
cases, though, respondeat superior would hold a municipality account-
able after the plaintiff surpassed the hurdles of Fourth Amendment
law30 7 and demonstrated that the injury resulted from an act or omis-
sion by an employee within the scope of his or her employment.30 8
Hence, the municipality would be held accountable for protecting
Fourth Amendment values, and it would be found responsible only
when it violated these norms. Respondeat superior would thus pre-
serve constitutional standards of responsibility for government entities
in police abuse cases.
301. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
302. Rothfeld, supra note 58, at 964.
303. See supra note 5; see also Amicus Brief of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund at
22 n.14, Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (No. 95-1100) ("Since 1989, at least seventeen judges, police of-
ficers, correctional officers, and border patrol agents have been prosecuted and sentenced under
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1996), the criminal counterpart to § 1983, for improperly using their positions to
rape and sexually assault women.").
304. See Whitman, supra note 251, at 250 ("When the government is the wrongdoer, ordinary
injury is augmented by the abuse of government power, and the Constitution has appropriately
been read to address these augmented injuries in their own terms, rather than by analogy to
common-law torts."). Whitman argues that negligence, "to the extent that it embraces an obliga-
tion of empathy or mutual care," does not adequately address how an institution operates. Id. at
259 n.149. Instead, she suggests examining the entity as an institution and finding liability in the
failure to act situation when the entity had an opportunity to prevent the injury. Id. at 254-57.
305. See JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS 644 (9th ed. 1994) (stating that under vicarious liability one "is held liable ... without
any fault of his own and becomes liable only by reason of his relation to the actual wrongdoer").
306. See Whitman, supra note 36, at 669 ("[Tlhe substantive heart of [a § 1983 case] is the
special power of the government to do harm, rather than the quality of the plaintiff's injury.").
307. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 761-
800 (1994) (describing the Court's complex and contradictory interpretation of Fourth Amend-
ment law).
308. See supra note 288.
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CONCLUSION
The deliberate indifference standard and Board of County Commis-
sioners of Bryan County v. Brown promotes a stronghold on outdated
precedent and the principle of allowing the government free reign
over its citizenry. By maintaining the high threshold for § 1983 plain-
tiffs challenging municipalities for their officers' blatant abuses, the
Court ignores the social reality of litigation costs, trial court barriers,
and the law's distinct role in barring victims from deserved compensa-
tion. As a result, the police continue to possess their power to infringe
others' constitutional rights without penalty. The Court, as Justice
Breyer recommended, must reassess these errors and adopt respon-
deat superior liability to sufficiently hold municipalities responsible
for this abuse of power. For victims like Abner Louima, the federal
judicial system remains the most beneficial avenue for redressing
wrongs and changing police behavior.
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